Nonviolent Repression in Electoral Autocracies

Contemporary autocrats are said to rule by a 'velvet fist'. Rather than relying primarily on brutal repression to manage society at home, they increasingly use the law to manage and constrain protest. Yet while research on authoritarian politics has focused extensively on coercion and violent repression, we know much less about how these nonviolent strategies shape opposition behaviour and regime stability.

This project examines how one common but poorly understood strategy of nonviolent repression — the regulation of protest through notification and authorisation requirements — affects coordination among opposition parties and voters in electoral autocracies. These regimes combine authoritarian practices with multiparty elections and are the dominant form of nondemocracy today.

The project argues that protest regulation can provide autocrats with a powerful tool for dividing their opponents. Under certain conditions, it can inhibit coordination between 'moderate' and 'extremist' opposition groups and reduce popular support for organisers of unauthorised protests.